On taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: empirics to a celebrated literature by Asongu, Simplice A
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On taxation, political accountability and
foreign aid: empirics to a celebrated
literature
Simplice A Asongu
12. May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63152/
MPRA Paper No. 63152, posted 22. March 2015 14:30 UTC
1 
 
 
 
AFRICAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
INSTITUTE 
A G D I   Working Paper 
WP/14/017 
On taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: empirics to a 
celebrated literature 
 
Published: South African Journal of Economics  
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute,  
Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
© 2014 African Governance and Development Institute                                                          WP/17/14 
 
AGDI Working Paper 
Research Department  
 
On taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: empirics to a 
celebrated literature 
 
Simplice A. Asongu
1
  
May 2014 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had 
an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned that his 
findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust empirical 
evidence. This paper puts some empirical structure to the celebrated literature. The empirical 
evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 broadly 
confirms the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the absence of foreign aid, 
the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the leverage for better political 
governance.  
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 Simplice A. Asongu is Lead economist in the Research Department of the AGDI (asongus@afridev.org).  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 One of the root causes of Africa’s poverty has been attributed to the poor quality of 
institutions: political instability, hostile regulatory environment for investment, high 
corruption, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract enforcements (Easterly, 2005). 
Consistent with this narrative, for poverty to be eradicated in the continent, developed nations 
need to promote credible political governance and institutions (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; 
Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005; Jellal & Bouzahzah,  
2012; Asongu, 2012ab,2013a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013). For over half a century, the foreign aid 
literature has centered around three main themes. First, there is a concern of if development 
assistance is allocated more to undeveloped countries with better institutions. Second, there is 
the issue of how institutional quality is affected by foreign aid. Third, there is another concern 
of the instrumentality of foreign aid in the quality of government. In other words, the manner 
in which development assistance donors can utilize aid to improve institutions.  
 The nexus between taxation and political governance which has been substantially 
debated in the foreign aid literature falls within the second strand of the literature. 
Accordingly, concerns have been consistently raised as to whether foreign aid improves 
institutions in Africa. Given that foreign aid in certain African countries far exceeds 
government expenditure and that the former mitigates government dependency on tax 
revenues, the role of foreign aid in the quality of institutions (especially political governance) 
has been an important concern in academic and policy making circles (Eubank, 2012). While 
the positive nexus between tax dependency and political accountability has been established 
(Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004), the effect of foreign aid on institutional quality has been an 
object of heated debate (Brautigam & Knack, 2004) especially in recent African aid literature 
(Jellal & Asongu, 2013). This paper focuses on the second strand in light of the celebrated 
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Eubank (2012) hypothesis
2
. It also complements an extensive literature on the theoretical and 
empirical underpinnings of the hypothesis (Morton, 1994; Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; 
Timmons, 2005; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009). 
 The theoretical underpinnings of the debate are deeply rooted in the history of 
economic thought. The underlying hypothesis resulted from negotiations between autocratic 
governments who needed tax revenues as means of surviving inter-state conflicts and citizens 
who were willing to consent to taxation only and only if tax paid was in exchange for greater 
government accountability and more public service delivery (Moore, 2008; Eubank, 2012). 
Accordingly, the dependence of government on local financial resources provides taxpayers 
with significant leverage on the government for the request of more representative and 
accountable political institutions. Eubank’s findings have significant policy implications for 
Africa because Somaliland which is not ineligible for development assistance has a high rate 
of political accountability and very little or no inter-state conflict. The case of this country has 
recently consolidated the argument that understanding the nexus between accountability and 
taxation is an important policy debate in contemporary African development.  
 The present study has a threefold contribution to existing literature. First, we assess if 
the findings of the underpinning paper are relevant to the entire African continent.  The 
Eubank (2012) finding on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had an 
important influence in academic and policy-making debates. This paper puts some empirical 
structure to the celebrated literature by assessing the hypothesis of a positive nexus between 
tax revenues and political governance in the absence of foreign aid
3
. In essence, it assesses 
                                                          
2
 The Eubank (2012) paper has received the 2013 Best Paper Award from the Journal of Development Studies.  
3
 “For years, studies of state formation in early and medieval Europe have argued that the modern, 
representative state emerged as the result of negotiations between autocratic governments in need of tax 
revenues and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater government 
accountability. This article presents evidence that similar dynamics shaped the formation of Somaliland’s 
democratic government. In particular, it shows that government dependency on local tax revenues – which 
resulted from its ineligibility for foreign assistance – provided those outside the government with the leverage 
needed to force the development of inclusive, representative and accountable political institutions” (Eubank, 
5 
 
whether the Somaliland-based findings are reflected across Africa. This is specifically 
because a caveat to the paper has clearly outlined that the findings should not be extended to 
the entire African continent without empirical evidence. Second, the intuition that the 
dependence of the government on tax income produces an income channel of accountability 
has not been substantially covered in recent development literature. While a lot has been 
covered on the appeals of good governance in social and economic development, current 
knowledge on the driving forces behind government quality has remained limited. In this 
quest, an important number of researchers have focused on the relationship between taxation 
and political accountability in an attempt to understand drivers of representative and 
accountable governments (Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; 
Prichard, 2009). Thirdly, assessing the problem statement is a unique opportunity of 
extending the recent debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutional quality that is 
particularly relevant in the African continent
4
.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the theoretical 
underpinnings. Data and Methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. 
The empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical and empirical highlights  
 
 In accordance with Eubank (2012), the theoretical underpinnings largely draw from 
the dependency on local revenues by the government. In exchange of tax income, it makes 
political concessions in terms of accountability. Indeed, taxation genuinely comes with 
compromise in political representation (e.g  ‘no taxation without representation’) and gives 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2012, p.1).  
4
 For more insights into the heated debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption please refer to Okada & 
Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a, 2013a, 2014a), Asongu & Jellal (2013).  In essence, Asongu (2012a) has 
questioned the relevance of the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings in Africa. He has also responded to criticisms 
arising to further validate his findings from conditional (Asongu, 2013a, 2014a) and indirect channels (Asongu 
& Jellal, 2013).  
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the electorate some leverage over demanding greater voice and accountability in institutions.  
This thesis is most relevant in countries that are deficient of natural resources. Hence, 
providing the government with incentives to encourage investments by means of credible 
political, representative and accountable institutions. In essence, under financial stress the 
exchange of political concessions for voluntary taxation appears to be the most efficient 
means of collecting tax revenues. The hypothesis of Somaliland as presented by the 
underlying study is a new theoretical illustration of the nexus between tax income and 
political accountability in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The theoretical basis is 
that foreign aid could disrupt the growth of representative institutions due to low revenue 
bargaining: taxation in exchange for better political governance.  
 While the inherent nexus between revenue bargaining and political accountability has 
been covered in the empirical literature (Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein 
& Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009), the absence of a study that has focused on the entire African 
continent offers a unique opportunity of assessing the Eubank hypothesis. Accordingly, the 
number of studies that have focused on the problem statement have concluded that aid should 
be limited in Africa and the continent left to follow its own development course (Morton, 
1994). Evidence of revenue bargaining in exchange for accountability has been found in Latin 
America (Mahon, 2004). Consistent with Timmons (2005), greater dependence of the state on 
taxing the richer faction of the population (the general population) leads to more enforcement 
of property rights (provision of basic services). This empirical evidence is broadly supported 
by Mahon (2005) who has established that the more a government depends on tax revenues, 
the better are democratic institutions. A thesis supported in China by Bernstein & Lu (2008); 
in contemporary developing countries by Moore (2008) and in Ghana (Prichard, 2009).  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Dependent, independent and control variables  
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from the World Bank 
Development indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity is selected because data on 
political governance and accountability from the World Bank is only available from 1996.  
 Consistent with the underpinnings of Eubank’s hypotheses, the dependent variable is 
political governance. According to Kaufmann et al. (2010) the concept of political governance 
can be appreciated in terms of voice & accountability and political stability as has been 
recently employed in African institutional literature (Andrés et al., 2013). To the variables 
above, we add a composite indicator of political governance for more subtlety and robustness. 
The procedure for deriving this composite indicator is discussed in Section 3.2.1 below.  
 The main Aid independent variable is Official Development Assistance (ODA) in line 
with recent literature (Asongu, 2012a, 2013a; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 
2013). For robustness purposes we use three main ODA variables:  Total Net Official 
Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD), and NODA from 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. While the first and third are used in 
alternative specifications in the empirical section, the second is used for further robustness 
purposes to check the consistency of the results across specifications. Tax income is measured 
in terms of Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (Jellal & Asongu, 2013). We control 
for press freedom, inflation and public investment in accordance with the Aid literature. In 
essence, the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the fiscal behavior and investment 
mechanisms have been considerably covered in the literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & 
Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995;  Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Gomane 
et al., 2003; Mosley et al., 2004 ; Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Bird, 2007; 
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Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Benedek et al., 2012; Morrissey, 2012; Jellal & 
Asongu, 2013). We also account for the unobserved heterogeneity by taking into account 
income-levels, legal origins, religious dominations, openness to sea, resource-dependency and 
conflict-affected features. The criteria used in the selection of these latter set of control 
variables is discussed in Section 3.1.2 below.  
3.1.2 Controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity  
It is also worthwhile to discuss the criteria for the selection of the dummy variables 
used in controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity because rightly categorizing them is 
necessary for relevance of the empirics and quality of ensuing policy implications. It has 
already been firmly established that macroeconomic characteristics and other government 
quality indicators have the drawback of being time-dynamic. Therefore, non-dummy 
thresholds may be inconsistent given the 15 year time-span. This interesting thesis is even 
more correct when short-run (or business cycle) disturbances loom considerably. Hence, the 
categorizations are consistent with recent African institutional literature which has classified 
the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of income-levels, political stability, religious 
domination, legal origins, natural resources and openness to sea (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 
2014b). 
First, in the categorization of conflict-affected countries some issues could arise 
because of the difficulty in assigning countries within this strand in an exclusive and non- 
arbitrary manner.  Assignment of countries should be made in terms of significance in and 
rate of instability in the period with respect to the overall data length because it is unrealistic 
for any country to be completely free from conflict. We discuss this strand in two levels: civil 
conflicts and political strife. With contemporary stylized facts in mind, it would be difficult to 
object to the inclusion of the following countries in the first strand: Angola (1975-2002), 
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Burundi (1993-2005), Congo Democratic Republic, Liberia (1999-2003), Central African 
Republic (the wave of aborted coup d’états between 1996-2003 and the 2004-2007 Bush 
War), Chad (2005-2010), Côte d’Ivoire (1999 coup d’état, 2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 
2011), Somalia, Sudan and Sierra Leone (1991-2002). With regard to the second-strand, 
despite the absence of characteristics of formal civil war, Nigeria and Zimbabwe could be 
included due to their severity in internal strife.  
Second, in the categorization of petroleum-exporting countries, several issues also 
arise. (1) Some countries that export oil could also be politically unstable. In this 
classification, a country may be situated in many classes at the same time because we impose 
no constraints of priority. Hence, a country may fit into more than one strand as long as it has 
the requisite features that are relevant to the category. (2) The qualification in this category of 
some countries could be time-dynamic owing to: (a) substantial decline in oil exports and; (b) 
recent discovery of petroleum. (3) Some countries have macroeconomic features that are the 
same with petroleum exporting countries (e.g Botswana). To the last-two issues above, we 
take a minimalistic view by: (a) including only countries whose exports have been petroleum-
dominated for more than 10 years in the sampled periodicity and; (b) restricting this resource-
category exclusively to petroleum-exporting countries. In light of the above criteria, the 
following countries are selected: Angola, Algeria, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Gabon and Sudan. 
 Third, the intuition of colonial legacy is deeply rooted in the law literature: the 
substantially documented relationship between legal origins and institutional quality (La Porta 
et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999) which has been confirmed in recent African literature 
(Asongu, 2014c). Classification of this strand is consistent with La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). 
 Fourth, controlling for the unobserved wealth-effects is relevant for two reasons: (1) 
Economic prosperity could substantially affected changes in political governance and; (2) 
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wealth-effects have recently been documented to be instrumental in the quality of government 
in Africa (Asongu, 2012b; Asongu, 2014d). The Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank is used for the classification of countries in this 
category. 
Fifth, there could be an institutional cost of being landlocked. Countries that are closed 
to the sea could have a higher propensity to lower political governance (Arvis et al., 2007). 
Sixth, recent African literature has also established the role of religious domination in 
institutional quality (Asongu, 2012b, p. 191). This classification is in accordance with the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s (2011) World Fact book. 
Information on variable definitions (and corresponding sources), summary statistics 
and correlation analysis are detailed in Appendix 3, Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. 
The summary statistics shows that reasonable estimated nexuses could emerge because there 
is quite a degree of variation in the variables. The correlation analysis: (1) mitigates issues in 
overidentification and multicollinearity in the same specification and; (2) validates the degree 
of substitution in foreign aid and political governance indicators used for robustness purposes. 
The categorization of countries is summarized in Appendix 4.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal component analysis  
 Due to the high degree of correlation between the political governance indicators 
(voice & accountability and political stability), some information could be redundant. Hence, 
we employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of components in 
the political governance measures. This is a widely employed method used to reduce a large 
set of correlated indicators into a smaller set of uncorrelated measures called principal 
components (PCs) that represent a great proportion of the information in the dataset. To 
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reduce the political governance indicators into a single variable, the criterion adopted to retain 
the common factor is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). Consistent with Asongu 
(2013b), it has been advised that only PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one should be 
selected. Hence, the first PC in Table 1 is appropriate because it has an eigenvalue of 1.659 
and represents more than 82% of information. Therefore the first PC is our political 
governance indicator.  
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Political Governance index (Polgov) 
      
Principal  Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion(s) Cumulative  Eigen Value(s)  
Components     Proportion(s)  
 VA PS    
First P.C 0.707 0.707 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second P.C -0.707 0.707 0.170 1.000 0.340 
      
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 In accordance with Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine (2008), dynamic panel estimations have 
many advantages and one principal shortcoming when compared with other cross-country 
analysis (Asongu, 2013b). From the appealing side of it, two points are worth noting. First, 
both time-series and cross-sectional differences in the dataset are accounted for. Second, since 
the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term, in cross-country regressions 
estimation coefficients could be biased due to correlations between the independent variables 
and the error term. Moreover, in dynamic equations when the lagged dependent variables are 
employed, the regressors are most probably correlated with the country-specific effects. First-
differencing can be used to control for the unobserved country-specific effect. Then, 
instrumental variables are used to account for endogeneity. Hence, the control for endogeneity 
is the second appealing feature of dynamic panel estimations. This is essentially because 
misleading inferences and unhealthy policy recommendations could be due to biased 
estimates.  
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 On the other hand, the main shortcoming in this approach is that the use of data-
averages (shorter time spans) means that estimated coefficients should be treated as short-
term impacts and not long-run effects. However, this disadvantage is not a major concern in 
the present study because we are not employing data averages since one of the conditions of 
using the GMM estimation strategy is fully satisfied: N>T (53>15).  
 The dynamic panel regression model is presented as follows: 
titi
j
tijtitititititititi XPIFATTAPGPG ,
6
1
,,7,6,5,4,3,21,10,   

     (1)             
 Where ‘t’ represents the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. PG  is Political 
governance; A , Foreign aid; T , Tax revenues; AT , interaction between Foreign aid (A) and 
Tax revenues (T); F , Press freedom; I , Inflation; P , Public investment; X is the set of 
dummy control variables (Lower-middle-income, English common-law, Islam-dominated, 
Landlocked, Petroleum-exporting and Conflict-affected countries ); i is a country-specific 
effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and;  ti ,  an error term.  
 Borrowing from Asongu (2013b), the estimates will be unbiased only if the 
independent variables exhibit strict exogeneity. In the real world, this is unfortunately not the 
case for three main reasons:  (1) while the independent variables have an incidence on 
political governance, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out since political governance also 
determines independent variables (the amount of aid decision by Donors, public 
investment…etc) ; (2) the error term ( ti , ) could be correlated with the exogenous variables 
and; (3) time- and country-specific effects could also be correlated with other variables in the 
model, which is often the case when lagged dependent variables are included in the equations. 
This implies, the concern of endogeneity still emerges due to endogenous regressors. A 
strategy of dealing with this concern of the correlation between individual specific-effects and 
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endogenous variables consists of eliminating the individual-effects by first differencing. 
Therefore Eq (1) becomes:  
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi ATATTTAAPGPGPGPG                     
  )()()()()( 1,,1
6
1
1,,1,,71,,61,,5 

   tititt
j
titijtitititititi XXPPIIFF        (2) 
 Estimation Eq. (2) above by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) still presents biased 
estimates because there remains a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term. This issue arising can be handled by jointly estimating the regression in 
differences with those in levels, hence exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the 
error term and the lagged endogenous variables. We use both the difference GMM estimator 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998) but give preference to the latter estimation strategy in case of conflict of interest 
(2001, pp. 3-4; Asongu, 2013c, p. 49)
5
.  
 The two-step option is chosen instead of the one-step (homoscedascity consistent) in 
the specification of the GMM because it corrects for heteroscedasticity. In validating the 
models, we use two tests: the autocorrelation test for the absence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals and the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) for the validity of the instruments.  
 In summary, the main arguments for using dynamic system GMM estimations are that, 
it: (1) does not eliminate cross-country differences; (2) controls for the endogeneity and; (3) 
mitigates biases of the difference estimator in small samples.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al.  (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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4. Empirical analysis, discussion and policy implications 
 
4.1 Presentation of results  
 
 This section assesses three main issues: the effect of foreign aid on political 
governance; the incidence of tax revenues on the dependent variables and; the combined 
effect of ‘taxation and aid’ on political governance. Tables 2-3 below present the empirical 
findings. While Table 2 is based on Aid from the DAC countries with the Difference GMM 
estimation strategy, Table 3 focuses on Total aid with the System GMM estimation strategy 
for robustness. We further use the Aid from Multilateral Donors to confirm findings in Tables 
2-3 for further robustness purposes but do not provide them due to space constraints. For both 
tables, the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests broadly validate the models in terms of absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals and quality of the instruments respectively
6
. 
 Based on the findings of Table 2, the following could be established. First, foreign aid 
mitigates voice & accountability though the effect is not significant for political stability and 
political governance. The significant effect should be treated with caution because there is 
still some evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals (significant AR(2) test).  Second, the 
effect of taxation on political stability and governance is significantly consistent across the 
first (political stability) and third (political governance) specifications. Third, the combined 
effect of ‘taxation and aid’ is negative, implying that more aid mitigates the positive effect of 
taxation on political governance. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected 
signs. (1) Press freedom increases political governance. In interpreting the sign of the press-
                                                          
6
 As highlighted in the methodology section, two tests are performed in order to assess the validity of the 
models; notably the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation that investigates the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and the Sargan-test which examines the over-identification restrictions.   In essence, the latter test 
investigates if instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of 
this test is the position that the instruments as a group are strictly exogenous.  With respect to the former test, the 
AR(2) in first difference is instead reported because it is more relevant than the AR(1) that assesses 
autocorrelation in levels. Accordingly, for most of the estimated models, neither the null hypothesis of the 
Sargan for the validity of the instruments nor that of the AR(2) for the absence of autocorrelation are 
overwhelmingly rejected.  
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freedom estimates, it should be noted that, Freedom House from which the data is taken 
presents freedom of the press in decreasing magnitudes, such that countries which enjoy the 
highest press-freedom level have the least values (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 674 ). (2) 
While inflation is intuitively detrimental to the quality of institutions, public investment that is 
not tainted by corrupt practices could improve them.  
 
Table 2: Taxation, political accountability an aid (Difference GMM with DAC Aid) 
          
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
Initial (-1) 0.519*** 0.540*** 0.027 0.572*** 0.567*** 0.411 0.252 0.303 0.152 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.899) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182) (0.558) (0.550) (0.572) 
Constant -0.004 -0.003 0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.011 
 (0.670) (0.732) (0.595) (0.131) (0.137) (0.811) (0.834) (0.832) (0.599) 
Aid (NODADAC) -0.0003 --- --- -0.002** --- --- 0.0003 --- --- 
 (0.888)   (0.012)   (0.860)   
Tax revenues  0.003** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.000 0.0007 0.001 0.002* 0.003* 0.004** 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.095) (0.876) (0.409) (0.284) (0.072) (0.093) (0.027) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- -0.0001 -0.0002*** --- -0.00004 -0.0001 --- -0.00005 -0.0003*** 
  (0.183) (0.002)  (0.398) (0.190)  (0.484) (0.001) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.004 --- --- -0.009* -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.743)   (0.050) (0.682) (0.795) (0.722) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.006** --- --- 0.0010 --- --- -0.002 
   (0.025)   (0.623)   (0.279) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.038* --- --- -0.004 --- --- 0.011 
   (0.060)   (0.626)   (0.480) 
Income Level (LMI) --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a 
          
English  --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a 
          
Islam  --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a 
          
Landlocked  --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a 
          
Oil --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a 
          
Conflicts  --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a --- --- n.s.a 
          
          
AR(2) 0.244 0.339 -0.336 -1.953* -1.898* -1.001 0.085 0.162 -0.191 
 (0.807) (0.734) (0.736) (0.050) (0.057) (0.316) (0.931) (0.871) (0.847) 
Sargan OIR  36.954 35.642 24.751 35.723 36.353 24.285 29.265 29.918 23.310 
 (0.517) (0.579) (0.691) (0.575) (0.545) (0.714) (0.451) (0.418) (0.762) 
Wald (Joint) 50.37*** 57.78*** 100.13*** 24.32*** 25.24*** 22.39*** 10.030** 11.061** 25.065*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.025) (0.000) 
Observations  41 41 29 41 41 29 35 35 29 
Countries  217 217 112 217 217 112 155 155 112 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial: lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). NODADAC: NODA from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). LMI: Lower Middle Income Countries. English: English Common Law countries. Islam: 
Moslem Dominated countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting Countries. Conflicts: Conflict Affected countries. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. n.s.a: not specifically applicable due to OIR 
test (or instrument) constraints.  
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 Owing to substantial constraints in the instruments required for Sargan OIR, 
specifications in Table 2 do not entirely control for some of the documented unobserved 
heterogeneity, as shown by the non-specifically applicable (nsa) signs. Hence to tackle this 
concern with employ the system GMM estimation strategy in Table 3 because it: (1) corrects 
the biases in the difference estimator; (2) adds lag differences of the regressors as instruments 
in the level equation, hence exploiting all the orthogonality conditions needed for 
endogeneity- robust estimations and; (3) uses Total aid instead of aid from DAC countries for 
more robustness purposes. Table 3 below incorporates the points highlighted above. 
Table 3: Taxation, political accountability an aid (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
Initial (-1) 0.694*** 0.666*** 0.252 0.866*** 0.866*** 0.572*** 0.582*** 0.584*** 0.556*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -0.179** -0.248*** 0.306 -0.058 -0.062 0.623** 1.199** 1.141* 1.100** 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.171) (0.350) (0.280) (0.020) (0.039) (0.057) (0.024) 
Aid (NODA) -0.001 --- --- -0.00009 --- --- -0.001 --- --- 
 (0.157)   (0.899)   (0.320)   
Tax revenues  0.004*** 0.006*** 0.013*** -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0007 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.624) (0.828) (0.551) (0.001) (0.005) (0.020) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- -0.0001** -0.0007*** --- -0.0000 -0.0001* --- -0.0001 -0.0004*** 
  (0.011) (0.007)  (0.974) (0.061)  (0.110) (0.004) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.016** --- --- -0.013** -0.019** -0.019* -0.018* 
   (0.036)   (0.029) (0.037) (0.050) (0.054) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.002 --- --- 0.002 --- --- 0.0007 
   (0.604)   (0.233)   (0.882) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.034 --- --- -0.003 --- --- 0.009 
   (0.160)   (0.491)   (0.520) 
Income Level (LMI) --- --- 0.038 --- --- 0.002 --- --- -0.045 
   (0.827)   (0.951)   (0.657) 
English  --- --- 0.025 --- --- 0.042 --- --- 0.089 
   (0.854)   (0.393)   (0.481) 
Islam  --- --- 0.135 --- --- -0.073* --- --- -0.005 
   (0.401)   (0.093)   (0.958) 
Landlocked  --- --- -0.141 --- --- -0.049 --- --- -0.103 
   (0.395)   (0.359)   (0.450) 
Oil --- --- -0.021 --- --- -0.157 --- --- -0.147 
   (0.931)   (0.090)   (0.377) 
Conflicts  --- --- -0.823** --- --- -0.148 --- --- -0.440* 
   (0.031)   (0.191)   (0.094) 
          
AR(2) 0.420 0.372 0.517 -2.161** -2.158** -1.251 0.290 0.347 0.383 
 (0.674) (0.709) (0.604) (0.030) (0.030) (0.210) (0.771) (0.728) (0.701) 
Sargan OIR  37.799 36.962 20.607 36.578 37.504 19.752 28.539 28.998 13.746 
 (0.733) (0.764) (0.965) (0.778) (0.744) (0.975) (0.732) (0.711) (0.999) 
Wald (Joint) 111.45*** 144.47*** 281.70*** 126.3*** 136.5*** 3789.1*** 960.6*** 1072*** 1604.42*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  258 258 141 258 258 141 190 190 141 
Countries  41 41 29 41 41 29 35 35 29 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial: lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. LMI: Lower Middle Income Countries. 
English: English Common Law countries. Islam: Moslem Dominated countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting Countries. Conflicts: Conflict 
Affected countries. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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 From the findings in Table 3 above, the following conclusions could be established. 
First, the incidence of foreign aid is not significantly negative. This is contrary to the wealth 
of recent empirical literature that has firmly established a negative aid-institutions nexus in 
the African continent (Asongu, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a). Second, the effect of taxation on 
political stability and governance is significantly consistent across the first (political stability) 
and third (political governance) specifications. Third, the combined effect of ‘taxation and 
aid’ is negative, implying that more aid mitigates the positive effect of taxation on political 
governance. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected signs. (1) Press 
freedom increases political governance. (2) Islam-dominated and conflict-affected countries 
intuitively have less voice & accountability and political stability respectively. 
 
3.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 
 Before diving into the discussion of results it important to briefly highlight the spirit 
motivating this paper. Eubank has warned that the Somaliland-based findings should not be 
generalized across Africa until his hypothesis is substantiated with robust empirical evidence. 
The discussion should neither be construed as an extension of the debate over the 
international recognition of Somaliland nor as a validation of the thesis of proponents against 
foreign aid in African countries. Essentially, the objective has been to assess Eubank’s 
hypothesis in order to provide some empirical structure to a celebrated literature that has 
received the reward for best paper in the Journal of Development Studies for the year 2013. 
  The results broadly show that in the absence of aid, taxation improves political 
institutions in Africa while in the presence of aid, such institutions are deteriorated. This 
implies foreign aid is instrumental only when existing political institutions are already strong 
in the recipient country. The validation of Eubank’s hypothesis further has four implications. 
(1) Political institutions in Africa are not yet strong enough to absorb the great of bulk of 
18 
 
foreign aid flowing into the continent. (2) The issue of whether foreign aid can be used to 
transform political institutions in the continent is answered. (3) There may be  time and level 
hypotheses for the benefit of foreign aid in the transformation of institutions. Hence, 
institutions need to mature (time) and be strong (level) before the beneficial effects of foreign 
aid in transforming political institutions could be achieved. (4) The three points above may 
neither apply to humanitarian aid for special emergency purposes (like earthquakes, tsunamis 
…etc) nor to aid destined to provide basic survival needs in periods of war. The findings are 
broadly consistent with the bulk of empirical literature discussed in the theoretical and 
empirical highlights in Section 2 (Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 
2008; Prichard, 2009).  
  
4. Conclusion 
 
 The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid 
has had an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned 
that his findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust 
empirical evidence. This paper has put some empirical structure to the celebrated literature. 
The empirical evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-
2010 has broadly confirmed the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the 
absence of foreign aid, the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the 
leverage for better political governance.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
Political Stability (or No violence) -0.557 0.958 -3.311 1.143 636 
Voice & Accountability  -0.674 0.734 -2.174 1.047 636 
Political Governance (Polgov) -0.000 1.288 -3.300 2.748 636 
Tax revenues  26.556 13.528 3.456 162.20 528 
Foreign Aid (NODA) 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
Foreign Aid (NODADAC) 6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
Press Freedom  57.372 19.234 17.00 94.00 611 
Inflation  57.556 955.55 -100.0 24411 673 
Public Investment  7.449 4.500 0.000 39.98 655 
Income Level (LMI) 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
English  0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Islam  0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Landlocked 0.283 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
Oil 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Conflicts  0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development 
Assistance. NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix  
      
Dependent variables Independent variables Dummy variables  
PolS VA PG Tax Aid1 Tax 
Aid1 
Aid2 Tax
Aid2 
Press Infl. PubI LMI Eng. Islam LL Oil Con  
1.00 0.65 0.91 0.29 -0.14 0.04 -0.14 0.03 -0.64 -0.06 0.24 -0.03 0.05 -0.15 -0.04 -0.23 -0.64 PolS 
 1.00 0.91 0.00 -0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.91 -0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.24 -0.21 0.01 -0.37 -0.39 VA 
  1.00 0.15 -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.06 -0.84 -0.07 0.14 -0.06 0.16 -0.20 -0.01 -0.33 -0.57 PG 
   1.00 -0.07 0.37 -0.03 0.41 -0.11 -0.10 0.45 0.15 0.04 -0.01 -0.00 0.30 -0.09 Tax 
    1.00 0.81 0.95 0.72 -0.04 -0.00 0.19 -0.26 -0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.28 0.15 Aid1 
     1.00 0.80 0.96 -0.03 -0.08 0.39 -0.20 -0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.16 0.02 TaxAid1 
      1.00 0.78 0.01 0 .00 0.14 -0.22 -0.05 -0.09 0.05 -0.24 0.13 Aid2 
       1.00 -0 .06 -0.07 0.34 -0.17 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 TaxAid2 
        1.00 0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.06 0.08 0.01 0.30 0.49 Press 
         1.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.10 Infl. 
          1.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.27 Publ 
           1.00 -0.04 0.13 -0.13 0.20 0.13 LMI 
            1.00 -0.20 0.11 -0.17 0.13 Eng. 
             1.00 -0.14 0.12 0.04 Islam 
              1.00 -0.19 0.06 LL 
               1.00 0.20 Oil 
                1.00 Con. 
                  
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. PG: Political Governance. Tax: Tax revenues. Aid1: NODA (Net Official 
Development Assistance). TaxAid1: Interaction between Tax revenues and NODA. Aid2: NODADAC (NODA from the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC)). TaxAid2: Interaction between Tax revenues and NODADAC. Press: Press Freedom. Infl: Inflation. PubI: 
Public Investment. LMI: Lower Middle Income. Eng: English Common Law countries. Islam: Islam Dominated countries. LL: Landlocked 
countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. Con: Conflict-Affected countries.  
 
   
 
20 
 
Appendix 3: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Political Stability  Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will  
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and  
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Voice & Accountability Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the 
extent  
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in  
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of  
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Political Governance  First Principal Component of Political Stability and 
Voice & Accountability  
PCA 
   
Tax revenues  Total revenues (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Foreign Aid (NODA) Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Foreign Aid (NODADAC) NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Tax.Aid  Product of Tax revenues and Foreign Aid World Bank (WDI) 
   
Press Freedom  Press Freedom Quality  Freedom House 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Inflation (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Public Investment  Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  NODA: 
Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Upper Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa.  
10 
   
Lower Middle 
Income  
Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
12 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 
    
 
Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
33 
    
21 
 
 
Religious 
Domination 
 
 
Christianity  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
33 
   
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia. 
20 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
43 
    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
41 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
38 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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